To call attention to and motivate action on ethical issues in business or society, messengers often criticize groups for wrongdoing and ask these groups to change their behavior. When criticizing target groups, messengers frequently identify and express concern about harm caused to a victim group, and in the process address a target group by criticizing them for causing this harm and imploring them to change. However, we find that when messengers criticize a target group for causing harm to a victim (...) group in this way—expressing _singular concern_ for the victim group—members of the target group infer, often incorrectly, that the messenger views the target group as less moral and unworthy of concern. This inferred lack of moral concern reduces criticism acceptance and prompts backlash from the target group. To address this problem, we introduce _dual concern_ messaging—messages that simultaneously communicate that a target group causes harm to a victim group and express concern for the target group. A series of several experiments demonstrate that dual concern messages reduce inferences that a critical messenger lacks moral concern for the criticized target group, increase the persuasiveness of the criticism among members of the target group, and reduce backlash from consumers against a corporate messenger. When pursuing justice for victims of a target group, dual concern messages that communicate concern for the victim group _as well as_ the target group are more effective in fostering openness toward criticism, rather than defensiveness, in a target group, thus setting the stage for change. (shrink)

This is my review of D.W. Howe's 2007 book, What Hath God Wrought, Transformation of America 1815-1848. The book is a volume in the new Oxford History of the U.S.(O.U.P. 2007)--exploring the transformation of the early American republic through the period of domination of the Jacksonian Democrats. This is also the period of the New England Renaissance and the early work of R.W. Emerson. Howe devotes a good deal of attention to Emerson and his influence and thereby provides (...) needed historical context for the understanding of American thought. (shrink)

There is a problem with the definition of talent as presented by Howe et al. that makes it dependent on experts' ability to detect it in the untrained. In addition, the choice of musical performance as the example for innate talent is inappropriate, and musical board results are selective and biased tests of it. Outstanding mathematical reasoning ability offers much better evidence of genetic influence.

Nocebo effects occur when an individual experiences undesirable physiological reactions caused by doxastic states that are not a treatment’s core or characteristic features.1 As Scott Gelfand2 points out, there are numerous studies that have shown that the disclosure of a treatment’s side effects to a patient increases the risk of the side effects. From an ethical point of view, nocebo effects caused by the disclosures of side effects present a challenging problem. On the one hand, clinicians’ duty to inform patients (...) of the consequences (including possible side effects) of their treatments is critical in ensuring that patients’ autonomy is respected. Patients cannot act autonomously if relevant information is withheld from them (without their consent, perhaps). On the other hand, clinicians also ought to minimize harm to patients. (shrink)

Vol. 7, n. 2, December 2023 (special issue).

Maintaining that the existence of Moral Philosophy, as it is usually understood, rests on a mistake, Prichard undertakes to formulate our true attitude towards moral obligations. The right action does not depend upon either our own good or what is good. Obligations are underivative, immediate, and self‐evident, and therefore, we do not come to appreciate them through argument or a process of non‐moral thinking. The mistake on which Moral Philosophy rests, which links obligation to virtue or desire, parallels the mistake (...) underpinning the Theory of Knowledge. Like moral obligation, knowledge is immediate; it need not be vindicated or improved by additional knowledge. (shrink)

The act of exchanging one thing for another seems to involve a promise. The confidence needed to relinquish something one has on the understanding that one will receive what another has in exchange can be expressed in terms of resolve. In binding oneself, one thinks that if the other binds himself or herself to perform a given action, then he or she will do that action. In cases in which one person's action does not precede the other's, one's promise involves (...) thinking that if the other binds himself or herself, then he or she will carry out the promised action. (shrink)

The controversy over the equivalence of continuous sedation until death (CSD) and physician-assisted suicide/euthanasia (PAS/E) provides an opportunity to focus on a significant extended use of CSD. This extension, suggested by the equivalence of PAS/E and CSD, is designed to promote additional patient autonomy at the end-of-life. Samuel LiPuma, in his article, “Continuous Sedation Until Death as Physician-Assisted Suicide/Euthanasia: A Conceptual Analysis” claims equivalence between CSD and death; his paper is seminal in the equivalency debate. Critics contend that sedation follows (...) proportionality protocols for which LiPuma’s thesis does not adequately account. Furthermore, sedation may not eliminate consciousness, and as such LiPuma’s contention that CSD is equivalent to neocortical death is suspect. We not only defend the equivalence thesis, but also expand it to include additional moral considerations. First, we explain the equivalence thesis. This is followed by a defense of the thesis against five criticisms. The third section critiques the current use of CSD. Finally, we offer two proposals that, if adopted, would broaden the use of PAS/E and CSD and thereby expand options at the end-of-life. (shrink)

Study and teaching of Islam with refererence to Qurʼan and Hadith.

Analyses Green's rather obscure treatment of two important questions: ‘Why does a subject have the duty to obey the ruler or sovereign?’; and ‘Why is the receipt of an order backed by a threat sufficient to establish this duty when the order comes from a ruler?’ Prichard considers Green's position regarding the grounds and justification for obedience to law to be part of a larger theory of moral obligation that is inconsistent with our ordinary moral ideas. To Green's seeming denial (...) of the existence of any natural rights or duties, Prichard responds that Green in fact has failed to state a sense in which there really are natural rights and obligations. Moreover, Green's denial that we can answer the question ‘Why ought we to obey the government?’ can be formulated only by maintaining the existence of an obligation independent of our government's commands. The core of truth in Green's position, according to Prichard, lies in his recognition that a factor necessary to secure obedience is the subject's unselfish interest in the welfare of other members of her community. (shrink)

Endeavours to specify what Aristotle means by αγαθον. In some contexts, this term seems to mean simply ‘that being desired’ or a person's ultimate or non‐ultimate end or aim. In other contexts, αγαθον takes on a normative quality. For his statements to have content, argues Prichard, Aristotle must hold that when we pursue something of a certain kind, such as an honour, we pursue it as a good. Prichard argues that by αγαθον Aristotle actually means ‘conducive to happiness’, and holds (...) that when a man acts deliberately, he does it from a desire to be happy. Prichard attributes this position to Plato as well, despite the fact that both thinkers make statements inconsistent with this view of our ultimate aim. (shrink)

Concerning the nature of desires that pertain to actions, considers the view that we cannot desire something unless we know or think, first, that it does not exist, and second, that it does not exist now. Finds a core of truth in this, but modifies the formula to claim that ‘we can only desire the existence of that of the existence of which in the past, present, or future, as the case may be, we are uncertain.’ Put more simply, a (...) desire is not a desire for the existence of something, but rather a desire for something to be. It follows from this view that we cannot desire something to be the case when we think that, without a doubt, it will be the case. (shrink)

Often an action causes both evil and benefit for the agent. No general account can be given for what happens when one considers in light of this evil and benefit whether to undertake the action in question. Prichard maintains that in willing a movement, there are two acts of will. First, there is the willing to think more of what one shall gain in willing x, which results from the desire to will x. Second, there is the willing of the (...) change x. (shrink)

In discussing the fact that it takes time to perform an action, distinguishes statements such as ‘I shall do x’ from statements such as ‘I shall be under an obligation to do x’ and ‘I was doing x’ from ‘I was under an obligation to do x’. The truth of the ‘ought’ statements is independent of whether the action is done, as it is not necessary that one not do the action at the time required in order to be under (...) an obligation to do it at that time. For some contrasts between ‘ought’ and ‘is’ statements, the obligation, such as the obligation to go to bed, refers to the future. The statement ‘I am under an obligation to go to bed’ is equivalent to ‘from now on I shall be under an obligation to go to bed’, and does not require either that I shall not do the action or that I have not done the action for it to be true. (shrink)

Exploring the darkest side of organizations may have a potential to change our previous assumptions about business life. Scholars both in management and organizational research fields have shown interest in the "bright" side of behavioral life and have looked for the ways to create a positive organizational climate and assumed a positive relation between happiness of employees and productivity. These main assumptions of the Human Relations School have dominated the scientific inquiry on organizational behavior. However, "the dark side of organizational (...) life" may have more explanatory power than "the bright side". Hostility, jealousy, envy, rivalry, gossip, problematic personalities, dislike, revenge, and social exclusion are the realities of business life. A manager may devote most of their time to cope with conflicts, deviant behaviors, ambitious individuals, gossips, and dysfunctional rivalry among employees. It is evident that negative events and interactions among employees cost more time and energy for a manager than the positive side of organizational life. This edited collection specifically focuses on these issues and will be of interest to researchers, academics, and advanced students in the fields of management, organizational studies and behavior, sociology, social psychology, and human resource management. (shrink)